A Detection finding or SIEM alert becomes a structured intent, which deterministic software compiles into read-only queries: fields validated against the catalog, scope fixed to the tenant and its sources, and row, time and cost budgets enforced on each one. The case returns a verdict, confidence, rationale, key findings, evidence references and next steps. Analysts begin at review rather than at collection.

The verdict, its confidence, the reasoning and the evidence references travel with the case, and evidence that contradicts the conclusion is recorded rather than discarded. An auditor, a regulator or a reviewing analyst can reconstruct how the conclusion was reached.

Before the case is written, the conclusion is tested against the evidence that contradicts it. Where the evidence does not support a conclusion, the case is parked incomplete and the gap is named. A stalled source is reported as a stalled source, not as an absence of threat.

It cannot approve its own work, choose who receives an answer, or change anything in the estate. Policy decides which requests are permitted and who may receive the result, recipients are authorized before a reply is rendered and re-checked afterwards, and every acceptance, refusal and hold is recorded. Remediation stays in SOAR and XDR, on a human's approval.

Inference runs on local models on your own CPUs, with nothing leaving by default. Any external fallback is an explicit policy, configured and visible. It makes for a short security review.

Early access runs as a design-partner evaluation against a labeled set covering malicious activity, benign look-alikes, contradictory evidence and missing telemetry. Scoring covers correct and incorrect conclusions, unsupported assertions, cases parked incomplete, reviewer effort and cost per accepted investigation, against success and stop criteria agreed in writing beforehand.